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Although there has long been an interest in the agricultural economy, it is quite surprising to 
many that the agricultural sector of China actually has a record that is impressive in many 
dimensions. Growth rates of gross domestic product, agricultural gross value added and food 
per  capita  increased  substantially  between  the  early-1980s  and  the  mid-2000s.  Indeed, 
agriculture‘s performance over the past two to three decades was more impressive than any 
other country in South and Southeast Asia. Markets have boomed. The structure of agriculture 
has fundamentally shifted. Despite having the largest population in the world and high income 
growth (which has had a wrenching change on the nation‘s consumption bundle), since the 
early-1980s China has been a net exporter of food in all but one year. 
While  the  performance  of  the  agricultural  economy  is  well  documented,  there  is  less 
understanding about the environment within which this growth occurred. In particular, there 
have not been many studies of the external economy‘s environment that created some of the 
incentives for producers. In the past, there has been work on the nature of the distortions to 
China‘s agricultural economy, for example, Huang, Rozelle and Chang (2004), OECD (2005), 
Orden et al. (2007). Unfortunately, these previous studies have only been partial. For example, 
Huang et al. (2004) only looked at distortions in a single year; Orden et al. (2007) examined only 
six years between 1995 and 2001. The OECD (2005) examined only a small set of commodities 
and  made  a  number  of  simplifying  assumptions  about  some  of  the  most  important 
commodities, such as pork meat and poultry. In part perhaps because of the partial nature of 
these studies, they have come to a number of different conclusions.  
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent of China‘s agriculture integration into 
the  world  market  through  estimations  of  indicators  of  direct  and  indirect  interventions  by 
China‘s government in agriculture from 1981 to 2005. The main part of our analysis examines 
the  differences  in  prices  between  international  prices  and  domestic  wholesale  prices  at  the 
border, i.e., Nominal Rates of Assistance. We also consider distortions in the domestic economy 
by examining the differences between farm-gate and border prices.  
The  wide  scope  of  the  goals  and  objectives,  like  other  studies,  also  necessitate  certain 
limitations. First, the absence of data precludes us from examining the entire agricultural sector. 
Instead, we examine commodities that account for nearly two-thirds of the gross value output 
in all of the study years. Second, although we are able to judge from the price trends and an 
understanding of domestic marketing and pricing, and trade policy reforms, the source of the 
shifts in the distortions of  the agricultural economy, we cannot identify the exact source of 
changes. Also, although we use a revised exchange rate series in coming up with what we 
believe  are  the  correct  values  at  which  we  convert  international  values  into  the  domestic 
currency, in a way that is useful in making any comparison with prices in China‘s domestic 
economy, we do not analyze the effect of these assumptions. This is done elsewhere (Martin, 
Huang and Rozelle, 2006).  
The chapter is organized as the follows.  In the next section, we discuss our quantitative 
approach and sources of data. The results of the distortion analysis are presented in the third 
section. The final section concludes.  
Methodology and Data Sources 
In  this  chapter,  we  have  utilized  the  approach  specified  in  Anderson,  Martin,  Sandri  and 
Valenzuela  (2006).  The  approach  is  broadly  based  on  comparisons  between  domestic  and 
international prices. During the reform era these price comparisons provide indicators of the 
incentives for production, consumption and trade, and of the income transfers associated with 
interventions.  
Our approach essentially creates two measures of distortions for each major commodity in 
the agricultural economy. The first measure in our analysis is the Nominal Rate of Assistance 
(NRA). NRAs are used to compare the prices of commodities in the domestic economy (at the 
port)  with  the international  prices  of  commodities  at  the  border  (that is,  cif  at  the  port  for 
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have been made before we estimated NRAs. Conceptually, with NRAs we are trying to measure 
the extent of distortions due to tariffs, exchange rate distortions, and other non-tariff barriers—
at the border. 
Because  of  barriers  within  the  domestic  economy,  the  extent  of  protection  (or  dis-
protection) that is afforded by trade policies may not be the same as the real rate of protection to 
farmers. Since we have independent observations on the prices obtained by farmers in local 
markets we are able to estimate the nominal rate of assistance at the farm level taking into 
account  both  border  distortions  and  domestic  distortions  affecting  farmer  returns  (NRAf‘s). 
NRAf‗s are calculated after allowing for quality adjustment, tax or subsidies, transport, storage 
and handling costs in moving commodities from the farm to the wholesale level. Differences 
between  NRAs  and  NRAf‘s  arise  from  subsidy  or  transfer  payments  that  cause  the  prices 
received by farmers to differ from what they would receive under competitive internal market 
conditions.  
  While NRAs (and NRAf‘s) only measure differences in output prices, there may also be 
distortions on the input side. To capture these, it is possible to provide measures taking into 
account  direct  subsidies  and  differences  between  the  international  prices  of  inputs  and  the 
prices  that  farmers  pay  for  these  inputs.  While  these  forms  of  protection  (or  taxation)  are 
important  in  many  countries,  and  particularly  in  OECD  countries,  we  find  that  they  are 
generally relatively small and so we focus on the NRA and NRAf measures when examining 
distortions to producers.  
Exchange rate distortions present particular measurement problems and require detailed 
analysis  if  price-comparison-based  measures  are  not  to  be  misleading.  The  assumption  and 
methods that were used to generate our exchange rate series are in described in Appendix Table 
A1. For documentation of our complete domestic and international price series, see Martin et al. 
(2006).  
In  compiling  our  data  we  necessarily  had  to  make  choices  on  the  coverage  of  the 
commodities included in the study. Overall we have included 11 commodities: rice, wheat, 
maize, soybeans, cotton, pork, milk, poultry, fruit (using apples as a representative product), 
vegetables  (using  tomatoes  as  a  representative  product)  and  sugar  (both  sugar-beet  and 
sugarcane). Over the study period, these commodities accounted for between 75% (in the late- 
1980s)  and  60%  (during  the  early-2000s)  of  the  total  value  of  agricultural  output  in  China. Huang et al.      Chap.5:  Measuring Distortions in China’s Agricultural Sector     109      
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Because  decisions  on  production  and  consumption  in  China‘s  domestic  market  were  only 
gradually being allowed to respond to domestic prices, and because we do not have access to 
reliable data on the secondary market exchange rates prior to 1978, we focus on data for the 
period beginning in 1980. 
The data used in our study come from a number of sources, depending on the time period 
of analysis and the commodity.  Commodity balance data (production, utilization trade and 
others) are from Center for Chinese Agricultural Policy‘s (CCAP) CAPSiM database, which are 
mainly from the Ministry of Agriculture (production), National Bureau of Statistics of China 
(NSBC) (consumption and others) and Ministry of Commerce (trade). Domestic prices are from 
several  different  ministries.  Specifically,  farm-gate  output  prices  come  from  the  cost  of 
production surveys conducted by National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
Wholesale and retail prices of most products are from the Center for Price Monitoring, NDRC, 
the Ministry of Agriculture (China Agricultural Development Report), and the Department of 
Rural Survey under the NSBC. When wholesale and retail prices for some commodities in some 
years are not available, price margins from farm-gate to wholesale and retail are estimated. 
Much  of  the  data  on  margins,  transportation  costs  and  other  transaction  costs  are  from  an 
extensive set of surveys by Huang and Rozelle during the 1990s and the early-2000s, surveys 
which also served to establish which commodity price series provided appropriate bases for 
price comparisons. Some of this was previously reported in Rozelle et al. (2000) and Huang et 
al.  (2004),  which  provided  information  on  substantial  quality  differences  between  some 
imported and domestic commodities and resulting biases in price comparisons as a measure of 
protection. For more recent years, survey teams from the CCAP interviewed traders in 10 cities 
around China in 2006. The complete data series are in the appendices of Huang et al. (2007). 
The international price data (fob and cif) for all commodities except milk are the unit values 
of  exports  or  imports  with  adjustments  for  quality.  These  data  are  from  the  Ministry  of 
Commerce  and  China‘s  Customs  Administration.  For  the  border  price  of  milk,  because  no 
import prices for milk are available, we use the farm gate price of milk in New Zealand adjusted 
by international transportation and insurance rates to create a series for the international price 
of milk (cif) that we refer to as the ―reference price.‖ 
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The  Role  of  Domestic  Price  and  Marketing  Policy:  Before  examining  the  role  of 
distortions at the border, it is useful to examine the relationship between the available domestic 
price-series for farm and retail prices for the major grain crops (Table 1). The importance (and 
role) of China‘s domestic price and marketing policy for rice and wheat (the three largest crops 
in China) can be seen by comparing the state-set urban retail price and the state-set rural farm-
gate procurement price with the rural retail price (a free market price) before 1993 when the 
urban grain rationing system was formally abolished. Until 1993, urban retail grain prices were 
generally  substantially  below  the  price  on  the  free  market  in  rural  areas,  despite  the  costs 
associated with transferring grain to urban areas. This was a consequence of a procurement 
price system designed to provide urban residents with relatively inexpensive food. Only urban 
residents could buy grain at these low prices and only with ration coupons that were available 
in limited quantities. 
Table  1:  Rural  Retail  Price, Urban  Retail  Price  and  Farm-Gate  Sales 
Price of Rice and Wheat in China, 1980-2005 
  1980-1993  1994-2001  2002-2005 
Rice (in milled rice 
equivalent)       
Farm-gate price  1375  1889  1939 
Rural retail price  2069  2145  2112 
Urban retail price  989  2144  2112 
Wheat       
Farm-gate price  1126  1305  1268 
Rural retail price  1700  1433  1325 
Urban retail price  920  1433  1325 
Sources: Computed by the authors based on various sources 
Note: the prices are yuan/ton in real 2005 yuan. Using the years of 1993 and 2001 as time 
division points because the former is the year of ending grain ration policy in urban area 
and the later is the year before China joined WTO 
 
In addition, the marketing and procurement system may have been the source of additional 
distortions. The relatively low  selling price of grain at the farm -gate by farmers shows that 
China‘s food system in the 1980s was set up to transfer income from rural to urban areas (Table 
1, column 1). The amount that farmers received for mandatory deliveries was far below the free 
market price. However, there is some question about the effects on incentives for production 
and consumption given the infra-marginal nature of many of these transfers (Sicular, 1988). This 
is because after the mid-1980s, farmers were able to sell additional amounts at higher market 
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price. If a farmer sold more grain than was required by his/her delivery quota, and the above 
quota  price  was  determined  by  market  forces,  there  may  have  been  less  of  a  distortion. 
Ultimately,  however,  even  such  policies  are  not  fully  decoupled  from  incentives,  with 
seemingly  infra-marginal  transfers  away  from  rural  households,  for  instance,  giving  their 
members an incentive to move out of agriculture. These linkages have been shown by Wang, 
Rozelle  and  Huang  (1999).  Therefore,  the  distortions  created  by  domestic  marketing  and 
procurement systems may have distorted incentives relative to international prices. 
From  1994,  however,  changes  to  China‘s  domestic  marketing  and  procurement  system 
appear to have eliminated this additional layer of regulation for producers of rice and wheat 
(Table 1, columns 2 and 3). In the early-1990s the urban price began to rise above the farm-gate 
price; urban and rural retail prices also moved much closer together (Huang et al., 2007). This 
reflects  the  phasing  out  of  the  implicit  taxation  of  farmers  through  the  grain  procurement 
system. The gap between urban and rural retail prices essentially disappeared after 1994 (Table 
1). And the gap between the rural retail price and the farm price declined, possibly suggesting 
an  improvement  in  marketing  efficiency  (Park  et  al.,  2002).  With  the  disappearance  of  the 
distortions from the marketing and procurement system, the remaining distortions after the 
mid-1990s reflect only trade policies and not trade and domestic policies. 
Nominal Rates of Assistance for China’s Main Agricultural Commodities: All NRAs and 
NRAf‘s are computed at adjusted exchange rates (the estimated equilibrium exchange rates, 
Appendix Table A1) since we believe this measure is the right one to use to calculate the true 
rate of protection. In Martin et al. (2006) we report how the measures of distortions vary when 
using official and adjusted exchange rates.  
(i) Distortions to the grain economy before mid-1990s:  The distortions to the rice economy 
of China in the 1980s and early 1990s are characterized by two important features (Table 2, row 
1).  First,  the  NRA  of  rice,  an  exportable  commodity,  is  negative  between  1980  and  1993.  
Averaging -23%, the negative NRAs show that China was highly competitive in international 
rice markets during these years. Trade policy, however, kept exporters from shipping large 
quantities of rice onto world markets and kept the free market price of rice in China‘s port cities 
below  the  world  price. Clearly  this  demonstrates  China‘s  commitment  to  keeping  domestic 
prices low. Even if there had been no other distortions in the rice economy, producers would 
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The  second  feature  demonstrates  how  domestic  marketing  and  procurement  placed  a 
greater tax on farmers and insulated the domestic price of rice from the world market price 
even if trade policy had been liberalized (Table 2, rows 1 and 4). Because of China‘s marketing 
policy that lasted through the mid-1990s, the state‘s artificially low procurement price kept the 
price received by farmers systematically below the free market price of rice  as seen by the 
NRAf‘s. Because of this the tax on rice farmers averaged -42%. Rice producers were among the 
most heavily taxed farmers in China—given the large share of the crop‘s sown area and large 
negative rates of dis-protection. Importantly, our analysis shows how the state used trade and 
procurement policy to tax its rice farmers. 
Table 2: Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRA) and Nominal Rates of 
Assistance for Farmers (NRAf) in Cereal Sector in China, 1980-2005 
  1980-1993  1994-2001  2002-2005 
NRA       
   Rice  -23  -4  -6 
   Wheat  47  25  0 
   Maize  -1  7  16 
NRAf       
  Rice  -42  -8  -9 
  Wheat  10  24  1 
  Maize  -28  6  11 
Source: Authors‘ estimates  
 
Unlike rice, the NRA measures show that trade policy offered high rates of protection for 
wheat farmers in China between 1980 and the mid-1990s (Table 2, rows 2 and 5).  During the 
period 1980-1993 the free market price of wheat in China‘s port cities was 47% higher than the 
international  price  of  wheat  (cif,  China‘s  port  cities).  Unlike  rice,  which  China  produced 
competitively  during  the  1980s,  wheat  producers—who  have  been  shown  to  produce  at  a 
higher cost than many other producers in other countries (Huang and Ma, 2000)—received 
strong protection from trade policy. This policy on its own, unlike that for rice would not be 
consistent with providing inexpensive food for consumers. It would, however, be consistent 
with a policy of food self-sufficiency since it would encourage greater production by keeping 
out imports and keeping domestic prices high. 
Domestic marketing policies, however, were working in the opposite direction of trade 
policies. The trends of the NRAf‘s show how the forced deliveries of wheat quotas insulated 
farmers from the high rates of protection (Table 2, row 5). Although there was still positive Huang et al.      Chap.5:  Measuring Distortions in China’s Agricultural Sector     113      
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protection  for  wheat  farmers  in  most  years  between  1980  and  1994  the  rates  were  lower 
(averaging about 10%). These figures—along with those for rice—show that at least for China‘s 
staple food crops, leaders were not trying to use prices to encourage food security.  
The  story  of  maize  is  a  mix  of  those  for  rice  and  wheat  (Table  2,  rows  3  and  6).  In 
considering row 3, trade policy was providing very little protection for maize over the period 
1980-1993,  with  an  average  of  -1%  for  this  period.  Like  the  case  of  both  rice  and  wheat, 
procurement policy depressed the price of maize to China‘s farmers. Measured at farm-gate 
level, maize farmers were taxed by 28% between 1980 and 1993.  
(ii) Distortions to the grain economy after mid-1990s:  After 1994, our distortions analysis 
shows that China‘s international trade and domestic marketing policies have changed strikingly 
(Table 2, columns 2 and 3). It is apparent from the way the differences in the estimates of NRAs 
and NRAf‘s narrow that China‘s reformers were able to eliminate the procurement policies that 
had been taxing rice, wheat and maize farmers (either by reducing the tax imposed by trade 
policy as in the case of rice or reducing the protection as in the case of wheat). In other work, 
Huang  et  al.  (2006)  show  that  the  elimination  of  the  procurement  quota  contributed 
significantly to a reduction in the implicit tax burden shouldered by farmers.   
The  liberalization  of  domestic  markets  in  the  mid-1990s  was  accompanied  by  a 
liberalization of trade policy, at least in the case of China‘s major food grains such as rice and 
wheat. After the mid-1990s the taxation and subsidization of rice and wheat were clearly being 
phased out as the NRAs for rice steadily rose (became less negative) and the NRAs for wheat 
fell. Likely in part in preparation for its accession to the WTO, China‘s leaders liberalized trade 
for its main food grains to such an extent that between 1995 and 2001 most of the protection for 
the crops was eliminated. Since 2001, the NRAs for both rice and wheat have been almost zero.  
Interestingly, the case of maize is a bit different than that for other crops (Table 2, row 3). 
While NRAs moved towards zero in the case of maize, in a number of years after 2000, the NRA 
for maize has been positive (not shown by the average figures in Table 2). This indicates that at 
least in some years national leaders have been protecting maize producers. In part, as discussed 
in Rozelle and Huang (2004), this may in part be due to the rise of the lobby from Jinin province 
that has been successful in gaining protection for the producers of its most important crop. 
(iii) Edible oils and cotton: The biggest difference between the analysis of distortions of 
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policy has historically played less of a role. Although in some counties in China there was a 
procurement delivery quota for soybean producers, it was not as widespread as that for grain 
(in many counties soybeans were not procured by the state procurement system). In addition, 
the implicit tax on soybeans in places in which soybean quotas were collected was lower than 
that for the staple grain crops, there is little difference between the graphs for NRAs and NRAf‘s 
(Huang et al., 2007). The same is true for cotton—except in the case of cotton through the mid-
1990s free market procurement of cotton by private traders was not allowed. When reform 
finally came to the cotton industry in the mid-1990s, leaders did not move to a two-tier pricing 
system,  but  instead  allowed  for  both  private  trade  and  commercialized  government  cotton 
procurement stations. As a result, the measures of distortion for the NRAs and NRAfs of cotton 
are  nearly  the  same  (Huang  et  al.,  2007).  In  fact,  the  same  is  true  for  all  of  the  rest  of  the 
commodities (livestock; horticulture and milk and sugar). As a result, the discussion in the rest 
of this section—for all three periods—focuses on trade policy. 
The trends in the NRAs after 1995 show the strong commitment to trade liberalization for 
soybeans  (Table  3,  row  1).  Beginning  in  the  late  1990s  and  continuing  through  to  2005  the 
protection for soybeans fell from around 25 to about 10%. This falling protection, in fact, should 
not be a surprise given the integration of China into world soybean markets and the monotonic 
rise in imports (which exceeded 25 million tons in 2005). The story of soybeans—and the fall in 
protection  and  almost  full  liberalization—stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  that  of  maize  which 
enjoyed increasing protection.  
Table 3: Nominal Rates of Assistance for Farmers (NRAf) for Soybean, Cotton and 
Sugar-Crops in China, 1980-2005 
  1980-1993  1994-2001  2002-2005 
Soybean  na  24  12 
Cotton  -31  -6  -1 
Sugar-crops  33  28  23 
Source: Authors‘ estimates 
Note: The figures for sugar-crops are sugar output weighted average of sugarcane and sugar-beet  
 
The distortion analysis for cotton, in some sense, produces results similar to those for rice 
(Table 2, row 2). The combination of trade and monopoly procurement policies kept domestic 
cotton prices lower than world market prices in the 1980s and  early-1990s. Clearly it appears 
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relatively inexpensive raw materials. It is no wonder with such high implicit taxes on cotton 
that the lack interest by many suppliers (and serious insect problems) led to stagnant and even 
falling area in many regions (NBSC, 2004).   
After 1994, however, with the liberalization of domestic markets (mostly) and increased 
trade liberalization (somewhat) there has clearly been a shift in the level of distortions faced by 
cotton producers (Table 2, row 2). Although there were years in which there was fluctuation, 
since the mid-1990s the NRAf has been gradually falling to nearly zero. In recent years, despite 
the fact that national leaders could impose tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on cotton after a certain 
amount is imported, in fact, trade officials essentially have left the level of imports in most years 
to be determined by the market. 
(iv)Livestock and horticultural commodities: With the exception of milk, the patterns of 
distortions to China‘s livestock and horticultural sectors are quite similar (Table 4). In 1980-1993 
there was heavy implicit taxation on pork and vegetables. In part, as noted by Huang et al. 
(2004),  this  situation  was  created  by  China‘s  grain-first  policy.  Although  China  can 
competitively  produce  livestock  and  horticultural  commodities,  producers  were  neither 
encouraged to produce or export these commodities on a large scale. Part of this was due to 
China‘s own barriers, such as the quotas on exports into Hong Kong. Another part of the price 
gap shown in these figures reflects trade barriers facing China in export markets. While there 
quite possibly were grounds for some of the barriers (for example, foot and mouth disease is 
widespread in China), even if a claim was blatantly false it could not be adjudicated effectively 
since  China  was  not  part  of  WTO.  As  a  consequence,  China‘s  livestock  and  horticultural 
producers produced commodities far below the world market price and were neither inclined 
nor able to increase exports into global markets. 
Since the mid-1990s the gap between domestic and world prices of livestock producers has 
fallen, but the trends are not clear for horticultural sector. Emerging markets and relaxation of 
grain-first  policies  (often  called  agricultural  structural  adjustment  policies  inside  China) 
allowed producers to greatly expand livestock and horticultural production in large part to 
meet  the  rising  demand  inside  China  (Rosen,  Huang  and  Rozelle,  2004).  At  the  same  time 
China‘s  accession  to  the  WTO  and  the  appearance  of  an  export-oriented  segment  of  the 
livestock and horticultural industries has increased the interest in and feasibility of participating 
in international markets. In response, the price gap measures have been falling. It should be Huang et al.      Chap.5:  Measuring Distortions in China’s Agricultural Sector     116      
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noted, however, that the NRAfs are all still negative. If anything, China‘s presence in global 
food markets has given rise to more stringent rules and regulations on the import of livestock 
and horticultural commodities from China.  
 
Table 4: Nominal Rates of Assistance for Farmers (NRAf) in Livestock and 
Horticulture Sectors in China, 1980-2005 
  1980-1993  1994-2001  2002-2005 
Milk  73  17  24 
Poultry  -11  -28  -19 
Pork  -57  -19  -8 
Vegetable  -50  -22  -23 
Fruit  -19  -29  -28 
Source: Authors‘ estimates 
 
 (v) Milk and sugar: The story for milk and sugar is in some sense the opposite  of that for 
livestock and horticultural commodities. During the 1980s and early-1990s, the NRAfs for milk 
and sugar were positive and large (Table 3, row 3 and Table 4, row 1). Those for milk averaged 
70% in 1980-1993. Those for sugar were above 33% in the same period. After the mid-1990s, 
protection has been lowered, and NRAfs for milk and sugar were falling (to around 20-25% for 
the period 2002-2005).  
Conclusions and Implications 
The main finding of this chapter is that the nature of policy intervention in China‘s agriculture 
has changed dramatically over the past 25 years, transforming the agricultural sector from one 
characterized by high distortions to one that is relatively liberal and more integrated into the 
world market. In the 1980s and early-1990s (or the early reform period) there were distortions in 
both  external  and  domestic  policies  that  isolated  domestic  producers  and  consumers  from 
international  markets.  Importantly  during  the  early  reform  period  domestic  marketing  and 
pricing  policies  actually  served  to  make  the  prices  that  domestic  producers  and  consumers 
faced almost independent from the effects of trade policy. Because of this, even in the case of a 
exportable commodity, e.g., rice, a commodity that enjoyed little protection at the border from 
tariffs (meaning that the international price of rice and the free market price of rice were nearly 
identical), domestic pricing and marketing policies did not allow producers to reap the profits 
from international-level prices and instead forced farmers to sell much of their surplus to the 
state at an artificially low price. Hence, domestic policies levied a tax on farmers even though 
there  was  little  protection  at  the  border.  Similar  dynamics  characterized  importable Huang et al.      Chap.5:  Measuring Distortions in China’s Agricultural Sector     117      
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commodities such as wheat and soybeans where, despite fairly high rates of protection from 
trade policies, producers were receiving much less protection than they would have had there 
been a free domestic market for the importable, while consumers were being implicitly taxed. 
In contrast, since the early-1990s (the late reform period), liberalization of domestic markets 
has reduced the distortions from domestic policies (as the market gradually has replaced the 
state as the primary mechanism for allocating resources and has became the basis of farmer 
production and marketing decisions). At the same time, especially in the case of importable 
commodities, trade policy has become more liberalized, with distortions from border measures 
falling substantially. As a result, we find that in recent years (that is, after China joined WTO at 
the end of 2001) China‘s agriculture is much less distorted in two ways. First, the differences 
between  international  and  domestic  market  prices  have  narrowed  considerably  for  many 
commodities  due  to  trade  policy  liberalization.  Second,  the  elimination  of  domestic  policy 
distortions mean that when trade liberalization allows for the increased import or export of 
agricultural commodities, prices in China‘s domestic market change and farmers are directly 
affected by them.  
Despite the finding that considerable liberalization has occurred due to policy reforms in 
both domestic and external policies, there are still distortions to agriculture in the mid-2000s, 25 
years  after  the  beginning  of  reforms.  In  some  cases,  these  remaining  distortions  arise  from 
tariffs on importable commodities and non-tariff trade barriers of other countries on China‘s 
exportable commodities. While low by international comparisons, China  is still providing a 
degree of protection for a number of importable commodities, e.g., maize, sugar and milk.  
With this analysis, we have shown that China‘s agriculture economy has become one of the 
least  distorted  in  the  world.  Clearly,  the  combination  of  domestic  marketing  reforms  and 
international  trade  liberalization  has  greatly  freed  up  the  decision  making  environment  for 
producers. In such an environment phenomena such as rapid structural change from grain to 
more  labor  intensive  commodities  and  the  rise  of  a  horticulture  and  livestock-based  export 
economy become more understandable. When farmers face less distortion they tend to move 
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1980  1.50     1.95   0.20   1.95   1.95  
1981  1.71     2.05   0.20   2.05   2.80  
1982  1.89     2.27   0.20   2.27   2.80  
1983  1.98     2.39   0.20   2.39   2.80  
1984  2.33     2.69   0.20   2.69   2.80  
1985  2.94     3.05   0.25   3.05   2.95  
1986  3.45     4.03   0.25   4.03   3.81  
1987  3.72     4.40   0.44   4.40   5.29  
1988  3.72     6.50   0.44   6.50   5.79  
1989  3.77     6.60   0.44   6.60   4.94  
1990  4.78     6.60   0.44   6.60   5.44  
1991  5.32     6.60   0.80   6.60   5.84  
1992  5.52     6.92   0.80   6.92   7.12  
1993  5.76     8.28   0.80   8.28   8.41  
1994  8.62     8.70   0.80   8.70   8.69  
1995  8.35     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.35  
1996  8.31     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.31  
1997  8.29     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.29  
1998  8.28     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.28  
1999  8.28     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.28  
2000  8.28     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.28  
2001  8.28     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.28  
2002  8.28     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.28  
2003  8.28     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.28  
2004  8.28     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.28  
2005  8.19     n. a.  n. a.  n. a.  8.19  
Notes:  a  NBSC;  b  Huang  and David  (1995);  c  The  proportion  of  foreign  currency  actually  sold  by all 
exporters at the parallel market rate; d see Anderson et al. (2006) on the exchange rate methodology and 
Huang  et al. (2007) 
 